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to the intrinsic motivations of corruption
Valeria Burdea
Abstract: Even though most of the causes of corruption are easily identifiable 
at the macro level, there is considerable disagreement when it comes to the 
intrinsic motivations leading people to engage in this activity. The present paper 
tries to shed light on the aspect concerning the correlation between corruption 
and individual performance. This is useful for understanding the dynamics 
of common events like medical students attempting to bribe their way towards 
becoming a doctor, or companies bribing public officials to obtain licenses to 
build public highways, buildings, or provide electricity and water. However, 
corruption’s secretive nature makes it difficult to obtain trustworthy qualitative 
data on this subject. Hence, the study addresses the issue in the lab, through an 
experiment based on a bribery game. The results show that there is a significant 
correlation between performance and propensity to engage in a corrupt activity, 
opening the way for an improvement in the allocation of resources to reduce 
this negative phenomenon.  
Keywords: laboratory experiment, trust, game design
Introduction 
Does being a low performer increase individuals’ propensity to engage in a corrupt 
transaction? More exactly, is there a correlation between a person’s performance 
and her corruptibility? The aim of this study is to provide insight related to the 
behavioural profile of an agent involved in bribery, so as to be able to better direct 
the resources available towards reducing bribery and corruption. 
Received : 26 July 2013The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 3
 
Burdea, Valeria  (2013) ‘Research note on an experimental approach to the intrinsic 
motivations of corruption’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VII:1
At the macro level, low economic development, whether the government is 
centralized or decentralized, short experience with democracy and free trade 
(Treisman 2001) are among the obvious and most researched causes of corruption. 
Despite this, there is a lack of comprehension at the micro level concerning what 
drives people to engage in corrupt activities. A better understanding of these 
causes is important in finding what institutional changes could be implemented to 
efficiently fight corruption (Dušek et al. 2005). 
A clear definition of the problem and its magnitude must be provided in order to 
see whether there is a real need to address it. Corruption, defined as ‘the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain’[1] is an important policy concern that breaches 
the rules of fairness by enabling unworthy people to access advantages at the 
expense of rightful candidates. According to the World Bank, each year, there 
are losses between 1 and 1.6 trillion dollars due to illegal activities enabled by 
corruption. The reason why corruption leads to such high economic losses is 
because it discourages new investments. Furthermore, it leads to a misallocation of 
governmental resources, acting as an ‘extra tax on citizens, leaving less money for 
public expenditures’ (Uslaner 2011). Decreasing the amounts available for spending 
on governmental projects, corruption lowers the quality of education, public health 
systems and infrastructure. Finally, it decreases the wages of public employees and 
the general public trust in government. This increases people’s propensity to engage 
in corrupt activities, and leads to the creation of a vicious circle. 
The most common example of corruption is bribery [2], which concerns ‘an illegal 
act where a person offers money or receives money from another person to influence 
the actions of a public officer or official’ [3]. Despite it being among the first 
causes leading to the above described negative effects, there are some consequences 
of bribery worth mentioning. These are related to the fact that this phenomenon 
provides unworthy candidates with access to certain privileges they do not deserve, 
and are therefore unable to handle properly. Such situations arise when medical 
students try to bribe their way towards becoming a doctor, or when bad drivers 
obtain their driving licenses without legitimately passing the driving test. Even 
more worrying are events when companies bribe public officials to obtain the license 
to build public highways, buildings, or to provide electricity and water. It can be 
observed that one common denominator of these examples is the fact that the bribers 
tend to be less qualified for the task than they should, or than other candidates. 
With this in mind, this study attempts to shed light on the relation between 
individuals’ propensity to bribe and their performance profile – being a high or a The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 4
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low performer. The hypothesis is that being a low performer creates an incentive 
to offer a more substantial bribe as a consequence of the need to compensate for the 
lack of skill.
Due to its secretive nature, it is extremely difficult to obtain veritable observational 
data on bribery. Addressing this issue in the lab can provide promising and unbiased 
results concerning the determinants of bribery and the efficiency of different 
deterrent methods. Therefore, this study will make use of a laboratory experiment 
to answer the question addressed in the beginning, and find out which type of 
individuals are more prone to engage in bribery acts, or in what type of situations 
this issue might arise. The experiment takes into account recent insight added to the 
literature by Gneezy et al. (2013) concerning the design of the previous experiments 
intended to analyze bribery. Previous models were based on the idea that at the core 
of a corrupt transaction stands the relation of trust and reciprocity between the 
briber/citizen and the bribee/authority, as well as the negative externalities on third 
parties. There is, however, one more important aspect typical for bribery actions: 
the distortion of facts or judgment. This appears when the authority takes the 
decision based on the bribe received, disregarding the performance of the candidates. 
It is important to take into account this aspect not only because it is influencing 
the authorities’ corruptibility but also because it influences bribers’ behaviour, 
depending on the beliefs they form regarding the value of the cost of lying for the 
authority. Incorporating this concept in the design of the experiment improves the 
external validity of the results. 
Competition among bribers is another aspect that is essential for bribery 
relationships, although not necessarily evident in all cases. This occurs in situations 
where companies try to obtain licenses to implement public projects (construction of 
roads, public buildings), when students compete for different certificates (medical, 
lawyer licenses), or to get into specific universities, when individuals compete for 
jobs, or when sport teams or athletes are engaged in competitions to win a prize 
or a title. The diversity of potential scenarios demonstrates why it is important to 
create a competitive environment in an experiment meant to investigate the causes 
of bribery.
Consequently, the experiment is based on a game design inspired by the one 
presented in the paper of Gneezy et al. (2013). It involves the interaction of 
subjects within groups consisting of 3 members – 2 competitors and 1 referee. The 
competitors are asked to solve a real-effort task in order to win a prize. Based on The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 5
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the results of the task they become either low or high performers, after which they 
have the possibility to bribe the referee in order to win the prize. In order to test 
whether low performers offer higher bribes 2 different treatments are used. In 
one, subjects are not aware of their competitor’s performance, and hence cannot 
evaluate their own performance – if it is high or low. In the other treatment, 
participants can observe the performance level of the player they are competing with 
and can judge their own ranking. The results of this experiment are significantly 
supporting the hypothesis that becoming aware of their own performance makes low 
performers offer a higher bribe (91.64% higher). In order to evaluate the importance 
of this result, one must take into account the difficulty to increase the detection 
probabilities of corrupt actions. This is limited not only by the scarce resources 
available, but mostly by an aspect which cannot be controlled – the transparency of 
bribery transactions is null as they are not formally closed, with a contract, so there 
is no formal way to detect them. Therefore, the findings of this study contribute to a 
better allocation of the resources available for fighting against corruption.
The paper is structured as follows: the first of the remaining sections deals with a 
theoretical analysis of bribery from the perspective of the economics of crime; then, 
the experimental design and the hypotheses are described, followed by a section 
in which the results are analyzed. The next part presents a discussion of possible 
controversial aspects of the study while the last one presents the conclusions and 
suggestions for future research directions.
The bribery game
Due to the secretive nature of corruption it is fairly difficult to accurately analyze 
the environment in which such behaviour flourishes. However, despite the existing 
restrictions, in the past two decades, the major negative effects of corruption have 
motivated more researchers interested in the economics of crime to focus their 
attention on decomposing the causes of this phenomenon and the effects of different 
deterrent measures. This section will focus on the latest addition to the literature 
concerning the modelling of bribery in the laboratory.
Experimental research is an area which has been extensively developed in the last 
decade in economics. Through this it is possible to manipulate different factors that 
cannot be varied in the real world due to high costs or unavailability of data. Two 
approaches have emerged in experimental research: a traditional one – the economic 
incentives approach, and a modern one – the intrinsic motivations approach. In The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 6
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terms of economic incentives, the dynamics of corruption depend on the size of 
penalties, the detection probabilities, the wages and the institutional changes 
like staff rotation, competition between public officials, whistle-blowing and 
intermediaries. The intrinsic motivations side deviates from the traditional view of 
deterring dishonest behaviours. This approach posits that corruption can be reduced 
through addressing feelings of guilt and shame brought on by the illegality and 
immorality of a corrupt act, by the negative externalities it causes, and by the social 
disapproval of such behaviour (Serra 2012). 
However, in order for the results of such studies to be externally valid, it is 
important to accurately grasp the defining characteristics of this phenomenon 
within the design of the games employed to analyze corruption. Therefore, when 
analyzing this phenomenon in the lab one must take into account that the main 
characteristics of a corrupt act are: the reciprocity relationships between bribers 
and officials, the negative welfare effects, and the high penalties in case the corrupt 
act is unveiled (Abbink et al. 2002). With this in mind, Abbink, Irlenbusch and 
Renner (2002) come up with one of the main models used to analyze corruption in 
the lab. This involves an adapted version of a trust game between 2 players – the 
citizen and the public official – in which the citizen has to decide whether to make 
a transfer to the public official or not. This transfer is intended to induce the latter 
to choose an option that is in the advantage of the citizen but that is costly for him/
her. The effect of negative externalities is also analyzed in their study, and it is 
found that this does not have a deterrent effect on corrupt behaviour. What they 
find to be effective however, is the introduction of the punishment mechanism, 
which is a rather trivial finding considering the fact that in the laboratory the first 
aspect that influences subjects’ decisions is their final payoff. Interestingly though, 
they conclude that detection probabilities are usually underestimated (Abbink et al. 
2002).
In order to create the reciprocity relationship based on trust that is characteristic to 
a corrupt environment in the lab, most of these experiments are based on repeated 
games in which pairs of players interact for multiple rounds. Therefore, it seemed 
natural to test methods meant to break this relationship. One such method is staff 
rotation, which proved to be highly efficient in decreasing the average bribe in 
an experiment of Abbink (2004). The option of whistle-blowing should also have 
a destabilizing effect on the corrupt relationship, due to the increased threat that 
the corrupt public official will be detected. However, Schikora (2011) finds two 
interesting effects of this option: first, its introduction leads to the stabilization of The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 7
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a corrupt relationship, and second it is used as an insurance against abuse coming 
from the public official.
Even though methods like increasing the penalties or the wages of public officials 
proved to be efficient in the lab, the costs associated with implementing them in 
reality are too high to be considered viable options. Additionally, the efficiency of 
increasing the sanctions is dependent on the detection probability. Since the latter is 
usually very low, higher sanctions rarely lead to a proportional effect in decreasing 
corruption (Howse & Daniels 1995). It is highly possible that there is a threshold 
after which these monetary incentives are no longer efficient – an aspect that is 
difficult to investigate. This view suggests that research should direct its focus on 
finding less costly solutions through adopting an approach more centred on the 
intrinsic motivation component that drives corrupt behaviour.
Modelling bribery as a trust or gift-exchange game leads to an external validity 
problem due to disregarding the distortion of judgment, and the intrinsic costs 
associated with it. This is common for situations in which the authority/judge 
takes the decision regarding who is entitled to a specific gain based on the received 
bribe rather than on ‘other objective criteria such as merit, performance, or 
quality’ (Gneezy et al. 2013). The refinement brought to the experimental model 
by this insight is important, as it helps to better explain the results observed in 
previous experiments. Additionally, subsequent models including this aspect can 
provide more reliable data regarding the reasons why people engage in bribery. 
This would enable one to better calibrate the effort to reduce the occurrence of this 
phenomenon. In order to implement this aspect in the bribery experimental model 
and to test its implications, Gneezy et al. (2013) conduct an experiment in which 
two subjects engage in a competition requiring them to solve a subjective real-effort 
task – making a joke – in order to win a prize. The winner is decided by a third 
participant who takes up the role of a referee. Additionally the two competitors 
have the possibility of sending a bribe, consisting of 50% of their initial endowment 
(equal to €5) to the referee. In order to conclude if bribes distort referees’ judgment, 
two different treatments are implemented: one in which the referee can keep only 
the bribe from  the winner (KeepWinner treatment), and one in which he/she can 
keep both bribes (KeepBoth treatment). The results are significantly different 
between the two treatments. It is observed that in the KeepWinner treatment, 85% 
of the competitors send a positive bribe while in the KeepBoth treatment only 34% 
do so. Moreover, their results show that in the KeepWinner treatment 86% of the 
referees award the prize to the participant offering the highest bribe and not to the The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 8
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one that wrote the better joke. Therefore, after the statistical analysis the authors 
conclude that bribery distorts referee’s judgment when their payoff depends on the 
choice of the winner. By contrast, in the KeepBoth treatment, when the referee’s 
payoff does not depend on who she decides to become the winner, bribery does not 
distort judgment. More exactly, the better joke wins in significantly more cases than 
the higher bribe. Comparing these two results, the authors conclude that greed is the 
motor of bribery and not reciprocity. Taking into account the fact that reciprocity 
would be the determinant of bribery, the results of the two treatments should have 
been similar. This proves that the premises that this model was based on were 
correct, and justifies its use in further studies.
Description of the experiment
The design of the game implemented in the experiment is based on the one proposed 
by Gneezy et al. (2013). The main difference between the two designs is the real-
effort task. While the original game makes use of a subjective task (making a 
joke), this study’s game implies that participants solve an objective task – counting 
squares. This section will provide a formal description of the game as implemented 
in both treatments – the ‘No info’ and the ‘With info’ treatments – followed by the 
equilibrium analysis.
‘No Info’ treatment
Players: two competitors (players A and B) and one authority (player C).
Real-effort task: Players A and B choose a positive integer representing their 
answers to the real-effort task. Player C does not have any action available. Based 
on these answers, the following states can be differentiated:
States:  ω1 = {Α: low performer, B: high performer}
  ω2 = {A: high performer, B: low performer}
Signals: τi (ω1, ω2) = si – meaning that players cannot differentiate between the two 
states, and therefore do not know whether they are low or high performers.
Beliefs: pri (ωj| si) = 1/2, i = {A,B}, j = {1,2}. 
Actions: Player A/B chooses a transfer amount: ti = {0,1,2…..100};The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 9
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  Player C chooses one action for each of the following two action spaces: 
  a1 = {keep ti, reject ti} 
  a2 = {A is the winner, B is the winner}.
  If a transfer is kept or rejected, it is automatically implied that the transfer  
      was positive.
Payoffs:  PA,B =  100 – ti + p   if i wins
         0    if i loses { ,   i={A,B}, p=100.
               PC =
 
100 + ti     if a1 = {keep ti}
  100     if a1 = {reject ti} {
‘With Info’ treatment
This treatment is the same as the previously described one, except for the fact that 
players now receive information about their competitor’s answer in the real-effort 
task. Therefore, the formal description of the game is similar to the one already 
provided, with 2 exceptions:
Signals:  τi (ω1) = s1
   τi (ω2) = s2 
Beliefs: pri (ωj| sj) = 1, i = {A,B}, j = {1,2} – meaning that players can now 
differentiate between the two states, knowing whether they are low or high 
performers.
Equilibrium analysis
If we consider the players to be fully rational and selfish individuals, they should 
resort to the following payoff-maximizing strategies. The authority should always 
choose the winner to be the player offering the highest bribe, independent of his 
task performance. Knowing this, the two competitors – A and B – should always 
offer the maximum amount of transfer (i.e. ti = 100 points).
Hence, the equilibrium monetary payoffs are: 
For player C:   PC = 100 + ti*, where i* is the player offering the highest transfer, 
and thus the winner of the game.
For players A and B:   PA,B =  100 – ti + p   if i wins
     100    if i loses { ,   i={A,B}, p=100, bi=100.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 10
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Additionally, it must be noted that this equilibrium analysis is valid for both 
types of treatments. This is because player C is restricted to keeping only the 
transfer coming from the player that she decides to award the winner prize to. As 
a rational player that wants to maximize her final payoff, C would only care about 
the transfers of points which are influencing her monetary payoff and not about 
the answers to the real effort task – whether a player is a high or a low performer. 
Therefore, it is expected that no matter the treatment, C would always award the 
prize to the player offering the highest transfer, and consequently, A and B would 
both send the maximum amount (100). This leads to the same equilibrium result 
from the standard economic point of view in both treatments. 
Experimental design and hypotheses
In order to answer the research question posed, a lab experiment was conducted. 
In the following section, the experimental design will be presented, including the 
design of the game and the procedures employed in running the experiment. The 
game is one in which players interact in groups of 3 as follows: 2 of the players 
(players A and B) compete for a prize by solving a real-effort task, while the third 
one – the authority (player C) – decides the winner of the competition. The winner 
is awarded a prize of p (p=100 points). His competitor does not receive anything 
after losing the competition. All players – players A, B and player C – are endowed 
with 100 points. Besides solving the task, players A and B have the possibility to 
make a transfer – send a bribe (ti) – to player C. The size of the transfer is limited to 
the value of the initial endowment (ti<100). The authorities are allowed to keep only 
the transfer coming from the player which they decide to be the winner. They do not 
receive anything else after deciding the winner. The transfers that are rejected are 
returned to the offering players.
In order for players C to choose the competitor that would win the prize, they were 
first informed about the decisions of players A and B in Part1 of the experiment – 
both these players’ answers for the real-effort task and their choices regarding how 
many points they would transfer to player C in case they became winners. 
Afterwards, players C had to find out the correct answer for the task through solving 
the task themselves. The excerpt from the instructions explaining this step is the 
following: ‘On the next page, you will find the task that the 2 players had to solve. 
You are asked to solve this task yourself. After solving the task you are asked to fill 
in the decision form where you will indicate the winner.’The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 11
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However, in order to make clear that the scope of them solving the real-effort task 
was so that they can reach the correct answer with high probability, they were not 
limited by time when doing so. Additionally, this portion of the experiment was 
designed as such in order to see the degree to which the judges rationalize their 
choice of the winner – to see whether players C would choose answers closer to the 
one of the player that they would subsequently decide to be the winner. This was 
possible to observe as players C were informed about the decisions of players A and 
B before solving the task themselves. After this step, players C were asked to decide 
which, if any, transfer they wanted to keep, with the clear mention that they could 
only keep the transfer coming from the player that would become the winner. It was 
also made clear that they were able to reject both transfers if they so desired. The 
experiment was designed as a one-shot game to control for learning effects related 
to the solution of the task. The task that players had to solve in order to be able to 
win the prize involved counting the squares in the image below in 1 minute (see 
Appendix for complete instructions). The correct number of squares in the image is 
163.
 
Figure 1: Task designThe Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 12
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The experiment consisted of two treatments, with a between-subjects design. 
This choice was necessary as each subject could solve the task only once. In both 
treatments, after solving the task, players were informed about the correct answer. 
In the ‘No info,’ treatment, players A and B did not receive any information 
regarding the performance of their competitor, so they were not able to evaluate 
their own performance; in the ‘With info,’ treatment, players A and B were 
informed about their competitor’s performance in the real-effort task. Thus, in 
the ‘With info’ treatment, players were able to evaluate their own performance 
relative to their competitor’s and determine whether they were the low or the high 
performer.
As opposed to the original design (Gneezy et al. 2013), in which the competitors’ 
and the authorities’ initial endowments were different (the authority was endowed 
with half of the competitors’ endowment), in this study, equal initial endowments 
were implemented so that players would not believe that they need to compensate 
the authority for the unfair starting distribution of the initial endowments. Thus 
any observed transfer cannot be biased by such a belief. Also, as opposed to Gneezy 
et al.’s design, where the two possible bribers were allowed to offer only half of 
their initial endowment, here the size of the bribe was restricted only to the full 
amount of the initial endowment. This was intended to provide the two competitors 
with a larger scope of decision. There are two other characteristics of a bribery 
interaction that are not modelled in this design: negative externalities and detection 
probabilities with punishment. The first one is not directly included in the design 
because its effect does not constitute the purpose of this study. However, one can 
consider that an indirect negative externality of a player offering a bribe is the 
decrease in chances for his competitor to win the prize. The obvious cost of bribing 
– costly punishment if detected – is not incorporated in the game because there 
was a need to maintain the design of the experiment as simple as possible, so that 
the change observed in the transfer rate would only be related to the implemented 
treatment.
Procedure
The experiment was run with 72 students of the University of Amsterdam 
from different programs (Master and Bachelor studies): Business, Economics, 
Accountancy and Control, Physics, Forensic Science, Earth Science. These 
represented friends and acquaintances that were recruited personally. Four sessions 
were run at the end of May (2013), while four others were run during the month The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 13
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of June (2013). The experiment was not computerized; all sessions were conducted 
using pens and instructions printed on paper.
There were eight sessions in total – four sessions for each treatment – that were 
run within the facilities of University of Amsterdam. Each session lasted around 
15 minutes and it involved nine participants that were randomly and anonymously 
matched in groups of three members and assigned to one of the three player roles: A, 
B and C. The participants were separated in two rooms as follows: players A and B 
sat together in one room, separate from players C which were sat in the next room. 
This random assignment was done through inviting each subject to extract a number 
from a bowl containing nine cards – six with number one and three labelled with 
number two. This number would direct them to one of the two rooms where they 
would be randomly assigned to a player role and an ID number as follows. While 
entering the respective rooms (1 or 2), players drew an ID number from another 
bowl. This number would direct them to their tables on which they would find their 
player role. In room 1 the subjects were randomly given the role of either player A 
or B, while in room 2 subjects were given the role of player C. In room 2 a second 
experimenter read the instructions and made sure that the participants followed the 
protocol.
After sitting, subjects received instructions which were read out loud. Additionally, 
the experimenters answered questions in order to make sure that all the participants 
understood the instructions correctly. No control questions were asked due to the 
simplicity of the design. Also, considering the design of the experiment, and that 
it was a one-shot game, it was important that the players’ decisions were not to be 
affected by any learning bias that could be caused by answering control questions. 
Another way to verify that the game was understood correctly was by studying 
the answers from the final questionnaire in which subjects had to explain their 
strategies in deciding the amount to transfer to player C, or how did they choose the 
winner between players A and B. 
The experiment consisted of two parts – in the first part players A and B had to 
solve the task. Afterwards they were informed that they could choose to transfer 
an amount of points from their initial endowment to player C. During this part, 
players C did not have to take any action. The experimenter present in the room 
ensured that there was no interaction among the participants during the first part of 
the experiment. In the second part, players C were informed about the answers and 
transfer decisions of players A and B. They had to solve the task themselves in order The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 14
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to find out the right answer and be able to decide which of the two subjects assigned 
to them would win the prize.
Finally, all players were asked to fill in a final questionnaire in which they had to 
detail the strategies adopted when making their decisions (either related to the size 
of the transfer – players A and B – or to whom to award the prize to – players C). 
In the end, players A and B received a piece of paper on which they were informed 
about the decision of player C and their final payoff.
The payment procedure implied that only one of the nine players within each 
session would receive her final payoff in cash. The selection of this participant was 
done by randomly and publicly extracting a number from a bowl containing all of 
the players’ ID numbers. The selected participant would then extract again the ID of 
the player that would receive his/her payoff in cash. The final payoffs ranged from 
€5 to €10.
Hypotheses 
For an easy way to follow description of the hypotheses, the following terms are 
defined:
–  Tr_Low_WithInfo = the size of the transfers coming from low performers in 
the ‘With info’ treatment;
–  Tr_Low_NoInfo = the size of the transfers coming from low performers in the 
‘No info’ treatment;
–  Tr_High_WithInfo = the size of the transfers coming from high performers 
in the ‘With info’ treatment;
–  Tr_High_NoInfo = the size of the transfers coming from high performers in 
the ‘No info’ treatment;
H10:  Tr_Low_WithInfo = Tr_Low_NoInfo.
H11: Tr_Low_WithInfo > Tr_Low_NoInfo.
The alternative hypothesis H11 is supported by the theoretical analysis which 
predicts that becoming aware of having a low performance level leads to 
experiencing two types of feelings of disappointment. The first one is related to 
the fact that realizing that one is a low performer conflicts with an individual’s 
image of self. Next, the expectation of an additional disappointment arises: the The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 15
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one concerning the fact that he/she will lose the competition. The first-order 
disappointment triggers the second-order one, which leads to the necessity to take 
action in order to prevent the occurrence of that second-order disappointment. 
In such a situation, bribing is the most efficient solution to reach this goal. In 
other words, in order to compensate for their lack of skill low performers have a 
tendency to bribe more. This would result in an increased chance to win the prize 
and therefore be a useful strategy in order to overcome second-order disappointment 
– the one of losing the game – and avoid another negative emotion. Each of these 
factors lead to an increased degree of rationalization of the dishonest behaviour 
when considering the role of a low performer. 
H20:  Tr_High_WithInfo = Tr_High_NoInfo.
H21: Tr_High_WithInfo < Tr_High_NoInfo.
The second alternative hypothesis (H21) is supported by two arguments. First, 
being a high performer increases the chances that the player will win without 
having to offer a bribe. Therefore, the need to transfer a positive amount of points 
to player C decreases. However, the insight related to this increased probability of 
winning is dependent on a player’s beliefs regarding player C’s honesty level. These 
beliefs are, on their turn, influenced by individual factors like culture or previous 
experience with bribery. Due to random assignment, one can assume that these 
individual factors are controlled for in the lab and do not affect the average end 
results. Second, being a high performer strengthens a player’s confidence that he/
she is entitled to win. In this case, transferring an amount of points in order to win 
contradicts the conviction of having the right to obtain the prize.
Does it pay off to offer a bribe?
The simple design of the experiment allows one to answer multiple questions, 
which are useful for the better understanding of bribery and to judge whether the 
research question posed in this thesis is worth asking. The statistical analysis will 
be conducted using non-parametric tests, and mainly the Mann-Whitney test. The 
choice of this statistical tool was motivated by the difficulty of testing whether the 
sample population follows a normal distribution. Even though parametric tests have 
more statistical power than non-parametric ones, in the case of the present study, a 
non-parametric approach was chosen as it is more robust against violations of the The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 16
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assumptions that these different statistical analysis tools are based on. Next, the 
main findings of the study are presented.
Do subjects offer a positive transfer?
The distribution of transfers across treatments is illustrated in Figure 2. It can 
be observed that the two most popular choices were 50 (33% frequency), and 0 (21% 
frequency).
Figure 2: Distribution of transfers across treatments
From all players A and B that participated in both treatments 79% (48 subjects) 
chose a positive transfer to offer players C. The rest of 21% of players A and B (10 
subjects – 9 being in the ‘No info’ treatment and only 1 in the ‘With info’ treatment) 
– chose not to give any points to player C (transfer = 0 points). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the majority of players offer a positive transfer.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 17
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The average transfer in the ‘No info’ treatment was 36.54 while in the ‘With info’ 
treatment it was 50.125. The difference between the two results is not significant 
when using a Mann-Whitney test (p=0.1039). However, it becomes significant when 
computing a Paired t-test, using a 10% level of significance (p= 0.0766). This suggests 
that more data could smooth the variance in the results, and therefore increase the 
significance of the difference between the 2 average transfers.
Is there a real difference in performance between subjects?
As the research is geared towards better understanding the effect of performance 
on a subject’s bribery behaviour, it is important to check whether after playing 
the game, the difference in performance was significant enough so as to conclude 
that there is a clear profile difference between players. The distribution of answers 
between high performers and low performers is illustrated in Figure 3. The straight 
purple line goes through the 163 point on the vertical axis. This value represents the 
correct answer for the real effort task.
Figure 3: Distribution of answers according to performance (Low vs. High)The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 18
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As seen in Figure 3, the distances from the correct answer in the participants’ 
responses are much larger for low performers than for high performers. From a 
statistical point of view, there is a significant difference (5% significance level) 
between the performance of the players that have been categorized as low performers 
and the ones that have been categorized as high performers (p= 0.0045, Mann-
Whitney test).  
Also, the average answer in the real effort task was not significantly different 
between treatments (130.75 – ‘No info’ – vs. 151.29 – ‘With info’ – p= 0.6127, Mann-
Whitney test). This means that the performance of subjects across treatments is 
comparable, and that there was no selection bias regarding the possible allocation of 
more capable subjects in one of the treatments.
Do low performers transfer higher amounts of points?
Considering that there is a real performance difference between subjects, it is 
justified to proceed with the analysis of the main research question of this paper. 
The graph below (Figure 4) illustrates the difference in the average transfer 
between the two treatments.
Figure 4: Average transfer of low performers between treatmentsThe Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 19
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As seen in Figure 4 the average transfer in the ‘With info’ treatment is 91.64% higher 
than the average transfer in the ‘No info’ treatment (55.42 vs. 28.92). This increase 
is significant at a 5% significance level (p= 0.0436, Mann-Whitney test). Therefore, 
the results of the experiment support the rejection of H10 in favor of H11. In other 
words, the availability of information concerning players’ performance, which 
allows them to evaluate their own performance, leads low performers to increase the 
level of their transfers. Also, it must be noted that in the ‘With info’ treatment, not 
only the average transfer amount increased, but also the frequency of a null transfer 
decreased with 89% (9 – ‘No info’ – vs. 1 – ‘With info’). This frequency change is 
significant after running a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test (p=0.0006).
Do high performers transfer lower amounts of points?
Where high performers’ transfers are concerned, there is an observed 1.51% increase 
in the average transfer from the ‘No info’ treatment to the ‘With info’ treatment. 
This change, however, is not significant (p= 0.9521, Mann-Whitney test). Hence, 
H20 cannot be rejected after analyzing the results, meaning that the average transfer 
of high performers is equal between treatments.
Is a higher transfer more efficient than a higher performance?
In order to answer this question, we first have to verify whether having a higher 
transfer increases a player’s chance to win the prize. The results show that in 72.7% 
of the cases the higher transfer wins. This number is significantly higher than 
chance (p=0.0029, Mann-Whitney test). Next, the chance of winning when having 
the better performance must be analyzed. In this regard, the higher performance 
wins 73.9% of the time, which is also significantly higher than chance (p= 0.0013, 
Mann-Whitney test).
After comparing the number of players with the higher transfer that were declared 
winners with the number of players with the higher performance that were 
declared winners the results show that there is no statistical difference between the 
probability of winning when having the higher transfer and the one of winning 
when having the higher performance (p=1.0000, Mann-Whitney test). Therefore, 
having a higher transfer is equally efficient in enabling a player to win as having a 
high performance. This result holds also when looking at how often low performers 
with high transfers win, compared to high performers with low transfers. In this 
view, there is no statistical difference between the chance of winning of these two The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 20
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typologies of players, each winning in 50% of the cases (p=1.0000, Mann-Whitney 
test).
However, after running a linear regression, in which the result of the competition 
(win/lose) is regressed on the performance ranking of the player and on his chosen 
transfer value, the results show that only the performance ranking is significantly 
influencing the result at a 10% level of significance (p = 0.067). The value of the 
transfer does not have a significant effect on the result of the competition (p = 0.440). 
Do players C let their evaluation be influenced by the received 
transfers?
The results show that only in 8.3% of the cases (2/24 players C) player C’s subjective 
evaluation of the performance of players A and B was contradictory to the objective 
evaluation based on the correct answer to the task. This frequency is not statistically 
significant (p= 0.6831 Chi-square goodness-of-fit test).
Do players C reject both bribes?
In line with the standard economic expectations, there is no statistically significant 
percentage of players C who rejected both bribes (p = .8383, Chi-square test). More 
exactly, only 1 out of the 24 participants with the role of player C rejected both 
bribes.
Does it pay off to offer a bribe?
This inquiry implies analyzing first, whether the final payoff of the players that 
offered a bribe is higher than for those that chose not to transfer any points. 
Consequently, the average payoff for high performers offering a positive transfer 
was 135.1 points, while for high performers that chose a null transfer was 166.67. 
This difference is not statistically significant (p= 0.2244, Mann-Whitney test). 
When looking at how efficient bribes were for low performers, the results show 
again no statistically significant difference between the two average payoffs: 112.53 
vs. 100 (p= 0.1456, Mann-Whitney test).
Second, I analysed whether offering a higher transfer pays off for either type of 
player (high or low performer). As it turns out, in this case there is no significant 
difference between the average payoff for those that offered a high transfer and The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 21
 
Burdea, Valeria  (2013) ‘Research note on an experimental approach to the intrinsic 
motivations of corruption’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, VII:1
those offering a low transfer. High performers with high transfers earned on 
average 142.92 points which is not significantly different than the 141.17 points 
average payoff earned by those with low transfers (p= 0.9556, Mann-Whitney test). 
Furthermore, low performers with high transfers earned on average 111.92 points, 
which is, again not significantly different than 105.39 points representing the 
average payoff for low performers with low transfers (p= 0.1611, Mann-Whitney 
test).
Discussion
In this part, possible controversial aspects related to the necessity, applicability and 
the design of the game are discussed.
Is a transfer of points perceived as a bribe?
The first aspect that needs to be addressed is whether participants perceived the 
transfers they were making as bribes even though the game did not imply that there 
would be any negative consequences for making a transfer. This suggests that it 
could not be considered as being an ‘illegal’ action. However, in order for a transfer 
to be perceived as a dishonest action, it should be clear for players that it is intended 
to influence player C’s decision through redirecting his/her focus from the effort 
task results. In this regard, the answers from the questionnaires were revealing. 
By analyzing the descriptions of the strategies chosen by players A and B it can be 
safely assumed that the transfer option was interpreted as intended – as a means to 
influence player C’s decision. 29 players (60%) [4] clearly described their strategies as 
having this purpose. Examples of such strategy descriptions are the following: ‘Just 
like a bribe,’ ‘The other player guessed better than me, so my only strategy in order 
to win would be to bribe player C with more money than player B’.  
Why would a player choose a transfer value equal to 50?
As the results show, 50 was the most popular choice for a transfer – 16 participants 
(33%) chose this value. The choice of this amount has two explanations. The first one 
is related to fairness or inequality aversion, as choosing to transfer 50 points would 
lead to equality in the final payoffs of player C and player A/B, in case the latter 
(that chose the 50 points transfer) won. The existence of such a strategy among the 
subjects of this study is proved by analyzing the answers to the questionnaire. Eight The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 22
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players’ answers reveal the use of a strategy based on fairness. A few examples are 
the following responses: ‘thought half = fair,’ ‘I just considered it fairly to give the 
half.’
The second explanation takes into account the endowment effect. This concept states 
that individuals value goods that they own more than they value identical goods 
that are not in their possession (their willingness to pay – WTP [5] – is lower than 
their willingness to accept – WTA [6]). Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky talk 
about the endowment effect in their concept of Prospect Theory as ‘the most robust 
manifestation of loss aversion’ (Knetsch, Tang & Thaler, 2001). It is sensible to talk 
about this effect in the present study due to the design of the game implemented. As 
players A and B knew that player C can only keep the winning transfer, and that 
they would receive their transfers back if they lost, the observed transfer values can 
be interpreted as individual valuations of the prize. More exactly, assuming that 
they would win, the offered transfers represent how much the players valued the 100 
points prize.
In the case of the present study, one can assume that without any information 
regarding the other player’s answer, the expected value of the prize is 50 points (= 
50% chance of winning x 100 points). Therefore, based on players’ WTP, there are 
two effects that can appear:
1.  Endowment effect: if the transfer is lower than 50, meaning that they value 
their initial endowment more than they value the prize.
2.  Reverse endowment effect: if the transfer is equal to or higher than 50. Under 
the influence of this effect, 2 categories of players emerge:
a)  Neutral players – those that offer 50 points, meaning that their valuation 
of the prize is equal to the valuation of their initial endowment.
b)  Players with high willingness to pay – those that offer more than 
50 points, meaning that they value the prize more than their initial 
endowment.
Taking into account this categorization, one can assume that the other eight subjects 
that offered a transfer equal to 50 were influenced by a reverse endowment effect. 
From this perspective, their choice was due to a neutral attitude towards the value of 
the prize.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 23
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Why would a subject choose a transfer value equal to 0?
Considering the very low probability of being caught in the act of bribing or 
accepting a bribe the question is not why people engage in such actions, but rather 
why doesn’t everyone do it? In the experiment presented, there was no probability of 
being caught, no cost for offering a bribe, and the certainty that players will receive 
their transfers back in case they were not winners. Still, there were subjects (10/48 – 
6 in the ‘No info’ treatment and 4 in the ‘With info’ treatment) that did not choose a 
positive transfer amount. 
Observing null transfers proves that subjects understood the game – that player 
C can choose whether to base her decision on the real-effort task performance or 
on the amount of points transferred. In other words, it was clear that they weren’t 
obliged to transfer a positive amount in order to win.
Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, choosing a null transfer is an 
expression of an intriguing behaviour. There can be several reasons why these 
players did not choose a positive transfer, some of them having been already 
mentioned in the explanation of the hypotheses. It could be the case that they were 
very confident that their performance would ensure them the win. One example 
to support this statement is a player’s strategy description: ‘I chose to send nothing 
because I was really close to the guessed amount of squares’. In such a situation, 
the transfer could be perceived as an insult to a player’s skill. Secondly, individuals 
might be risk averse, and would prefer to keep the full initial endowment rather 
than risk a part of it in order to gain the prize. Risk aversion is obvious in one 
player’s answer from the final questionnaire: ‘I did not want to take a risk, so I 
chose not to transfer any amount to player C.’
How is the design of the bribery game relevant for reality?
In the experimental laboratory, the possibility of bribing is part of the game 
– it is something accepted and formally provided by the ‘system’ (through the 
instructions). This raises the question of whether the individuals participating in 
such experiments would actually use bribery in the real world where this is not 
an alternative included in the rules of the system. Because it is an action outside 
of these rules (outside the legal system), in reality, bribery is driven by a much 
more powerful intrinsic need within individuals to pursue their interests through 
dishonest means. It is therefore uncertain whether any kind of bribery experiment The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 24
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would manage to provide results that are externally valid considering this aspect of 
the real-life environment in which bribery takes place.
Nevertheless, there is still a case to be made for such economic experiments. In this 
regard, one must consider that even if it is not provided formally by the system, 
bribery is systemic – that it is not part of how a system works. This is indeed what 
bribery has become – an institution (Teorell 2007). From this point of view, it can 
be argued that experiments that investigate this phenomenon through incorporating 
the ‘transfer’ option in the game are valid. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that the rules of the ‘bribery game’, are in reality unwritten rules. It is also very 
common for these to have become norms deeply engrained in a community. This 
is where the research related to the correlation between bribery/corruption and 
social norms intervenes. There are, however, great limitations in this area for lab 
experiments as due to the negative social aspect of bribery, individuals are biased to 
react dishonestly to the incentives created in the controlled research environment. A 
field experiment would probably be much more reliable in this sense. However, the 
noise involved in such a study and the related costs decrease its appeal. 
Conclusion
This study analyses the influence of individuals’ performance on their propensity 
to offer. This is done through an experiment which manipulates the information 
available to players regarding their competitors’ performance level, allowing them to 
evaluate their own performance and thus realize if they are on the high or on the low 
ranking. The main finding of this study shows that when subjects acknowledge that 
they are low performers the average bribe level increases significantly. Furthermore, 
the number of players choosing not to engage in a dishonest transaction increases 
significantly. This means that, as hypothesized, individuals’ propensities to offer 
points in order to influence their probability of winning increase when they become 
aware of being low performers. This can be considered a rational response to the 
newly available information (that of being a low performer). In this sense, the results 
show that a player’s performance ranking is slightly more powerful in deciding 
whether he/she will become the winner. With this in mind, since low performers can 
no longer increase their ranking, the only option available to improve their chance of 
winning is through raising their transfer level. 
This can also be explained by the fact that for these individuals, the value of 
winning is higher than the moral costs of offering a bribe. Therefore, when the The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 25
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chance of winning decreases due to a lower competitive advantage, subjects develop 
a need to compensate for their weaknesses. In this situation, the willingness to offer 
a bribe and the level of this bribe increase. This finding is helpful in narrowing the 
spectrum of search for individuals involved in this illegal activity. Additionally, 
it provides support for policies regarding the possibility of redirecting the efforts 
needed for bribery deterrence towards individuals that are suspected to be unworthy 
of the rewards they receive. 
Thus, the finding of this thesis contributes to a better characterization of the profile 
of a briber, suggesting that there is a negative relation between a low performer’s 
skill and his/her propensity to offer a bribe. However, it must be noted that the high 
performers’ bribing level did not decrease. Therefore, under this study’s conditions, 
performance does not influence high performers’ bribing behaviour. This could 
be due to several reasons: the type of the real-effort task, the size of the difference 
between the high and the low performers’ results or simply because high performers 
in general have a lower but positive disposition for bribing that is invariable with 
respect to the variability of their performance. Further research on this topic is 
most surely needed to clarify the suggested inferences. 
In this sense, one first direction for future studies would be related to how the 
performance in different types of real effort tasks influences subjects’ propensity to 
bribe. The task used in this study required mechanical skills. Further on, it would 
be interesting to study tasks involving more creative and cognitive skills. It could 
be the case that when subjects are required to employ more creative skills, they 
would value the exerted effort more and so they would expect that the decision of 
the authority be made on the basis of the test results and not taking into account 
the side payments. Another possibility would be to observe how the bribing level 
changes when the authorities are given the possibility to ask for bribes. This would 
enable one to analyze whether citizens are responsive to the requested amount, or 
whether they are insulted by the request and therefore their willingness to offer a 
bribe would decreases. This suggestion leads one to think about how the expectations 
related to the possible amounts that can be received or requested influence an 
individual’s propensity to accept or offer a bribe. Since these expectations are 
influenced by the social attitudes towards bribery, this last idea could be combined 
with studies looking at how the cultural environment shaping the social attitude 
towards bribery influences the level of bribing in a community, through influencing 
the expectations regarding the level of bribes that could be requested or offered.   The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 26
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Additionally, this thesis strengthens the case for focusing on policies that 
exploit human emotions (such as those elicited when losing) rather than policies 
involving increasing penalties or improving monitoring (so as to increase detection 
probabilities). It is important to see what kind of emotions are elicited when a 
person is losing, and afterwards implement measures aimed at reducing the effect 
of these negative emotions that increase individuals’ propensity to offer bribes. This 
suggests that intrinsic motivations rather than extrinsic ones should be employed 
in the fight against the spread of bribery. In this sense, measures could be taken 
so that the educational system would train its citizens for a better understanding 
of the world and for developing as individuals rather than with the sole objective 
of winning competitions. Trying to infuse a more cooperative rather than 
individualistic spirit could also be useful in decreasing the effect of the negative 
feelings experienced when losing in a competition.
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Endnotes
[1] Definition provided by Transparency International. Retrieved from: http://www.
transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption#defineCorruption 
[2] According to the United Nations’ Anti-Corruption Toolkit, Vienna, September 
2004.
[3] Definition provided by Black’s Law Dictionary.  
Retrieved from: http://thelawdictionary.org/bribery-2/
[4] 5 subjects out of the remaining 19 did not describe their strategies, while the 
strategies of the rest are included in 3 other categories: strategies based on fairness, 
based on confidence that their performance will enable them to win, and strategies 
influenced by the endowment effect.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 27
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[5] WTP = maximum amount a person is willing to pay in order to obtain the good 
that is not in her possession.
[6] WTA = minimum amount a person is willing to accept in order to give up the 
good that she owns.
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Appendix
General Instructions – common for both treatments
Welcome to this experiment. During the next 15 minutes you are asked to make 
decisions that will enable you to earn real monetary rewards. Throughout the 
whole experiment you are kindly asked to remain seated and refrain from 
any kind of interaction with the other participants.
All the participants in this experiment have been randomly assigned to one of the 
following player identities: A, B or C, and to one individual ID number. You will 
find this information on a piece of paper on the table in front of you. Throughout 
this experiment, players will interact within groups made up of 3 members each, 
consisting of: a player A, a player B and a player C (players A and B are in one 
room, while players C, are in the next room). This experiment consists of 2 parts. 
The composition of these groups will remain the same throughout both parts of the 
game. Keep in mind that all your answers are anonymous, so your identity will 
be kept secret throughout the whole experiment.All members are initially endowed 
with 100 points. 20 points correspond to 1€ (euro). 
In this experiment players A and B will have to solve a task in order to be able to 
win a prize. Winning leads to a payoff of an extra 100 points reward on top of 
the initial endowment. The winner will be decided by player C. 
THE GAME:
In Part 1, players A and B solve a task and write their answers on a decision form. 
During this part, players C are not asked to take any action.
Detailed instructions for Part 2 will be handed in at the end of Part 1.
Based on the answers in Part 1, the winner of the game is decided by player C 
in Part 2 of the experiment. The one that becomes the winner is awarded the 100 
additional points. 
During Part 2, players A and B are not asked to take any action. The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 30
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QUESTIONNAIRE:
While the final payoffs are decided, you will be handed in a questionnaire to fill in.
PAYMENT:
At the end of the experiment, 1 player out of 9 will be randomly chosen to 
receive her/his final payoff. This is going to be decided by asking one random 
subject to extract a card from a bowl containing all players’ ID numbers.
The payment will be done in private through handing in an envelope with the 
corresponding payoff.
If there are any questions please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to 
answer your questions in private.
Instructions for Part 1 for players A and B –  
common for both treatments:
PART 1:
In this part of the experiment you will receive a task that you are asked to solve in 
order to be able to win 100 points on top of your initial endowment. After this, you 
will receive further instructions for the next step of this part. The winner of the 
game is decided by player C, taking into account your answers in this part. Please 
write your player ID at the top of each of the following sheets of paper that you will 
receive. Keep in mind that all your answers are anonymous, so your identity will be 
kept secret throughout the whole experiment.
If there are any questions please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to 
answer your questions in private. Please remain seated and refrain from any kind of 
interaction with the other participants.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 31
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Task Sheet for players A and B – common for both treatments:
Task Sheet
Player ID:
TASK:
How many squares are there in the image below? You have 1 minute to count them. 
The scope of the task is to be as close to the right answer as possible.
 
Answer:……………………………….
After the 1 minute allocated for solving the task, an experimenter will collect the 
task sheets and you will be handed in instructions for the next step of this part. 
Please remain seated and refrain from any interaction with the other participants.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 32
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Decision form for Part 1 for players A and B – ‘No info’ treatment: 
Player ID:
Please write your player ID at the top of this page.
In the previous image there were 163 squares. 
Your answer was…………….
Before the winner is decided, you (player A/B) as well as your competitor (player 
B/A), can transfer an amount of points to player C (up to 100 points). This will be 
deducted from your initial endowment. Please note that player C can keep only the 
transfer coming from the winning player, or s/he can reject both transfers. In case 
a transfer is rejected this amount will be returned to the respective offering player 
(A/B). Keep in mind that your decisions are completely anonymous. 
Would you like to transfer an amount to player C?
  ¡ Yes
  ¡ No
If yes, please specify the amount:…………………………..
After this stage, an experimenter will collect the decision sheets and will inform 
player C about your decisions. During Part 2 in which player C will decide the 
winner, you are asked to remain seated and refrain from any interaction with the 
other participants.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 33
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Decision form for Part 1 for players A and B –  
‘With info’ treatment: 
Player ID:
Please write your player ID at the top of this page.
In the previous image there were 163 squares.
Your answer was………
Your competitor’s answer was:……………..
Note: the player A/B you are paired with is also informed of your answer, but not of 
your identity.
Before the winner is decided, you (player A/B) as well as your competitor (player 
B/A), can transfer an amount of points to player C (up to 100 points). This will be 
deducted from your initial endowment. Please note that player C can keep only the 
transfer coming from the winning player, and can reject both of the transfers. In 
case a transfer is rejected this amount will be returned to the offering player (A/B). 
Please note that your decisions are completely anonymous. 
Would you like to transfer an amount to player C?
  ¡ Yes
  ¡ No
If yes, please specify the amount:…………………………..
After this stage, an experimenter will collect the forms and will inform player 
C about your decisions. During Part 2 in which player C will decide the winner, 
you are asked to remain seated and refrain from any interaction with the other 
participants.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 34
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Decision form for players C – common for both treatments:
Player ID:
Please write your player ID at the top of this page.
Part 2: 
In this part, you are informed about the answers of players A and B in 
Part 1 and have to decide the winner of the 100 points prize. The decision 
should be taken based on who is closer to the right answer.
Player A’s answer was:………….
Player B’s answer was:………….
After solving the task, each player had the possibility of transferring an amount of 
points to your account.
Please note that in case a positive transfer has been made from either of players 
A and/or B, you can keep or reject one or both transfers. Also, all your answers 
are anonymous, so your real identity will be kept secret throughout the whole 
experiment. Note: you can only keep the transfer coming from the player that you 
decide to be the winner.  The offers that you turn down will be returned to the 
offering player (A/B). 
Player A’s transfer was:…………...
Player B’s transfer was:…………….
On the next page, you will find the task that the 2 players had to solve. You are 
asked to solve this task yourself. After solving the task you are asked to fill in the 
decision form where you will indicate the winner.
If there are any questions please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to 
answer your question in private.The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 35
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Task that Players A and B had to solve:
Count the squares in the image below in 1 minute. The scope of the task is to be as 
close to the right answer as possible.
 
Please solve the task above. NOTE: You are not restricted by time in this part.
Your answer:……………………………..
Please indicate if and which transfer(s) you wish to keep or reject, by underlining 
one of the options below. Keep in mind that you can only keep the transfer 
coming from the player that you decide to be the winner.
Player A’s transfer (if applicable):
  ¡ Keep
  ¡ Reject
Player B’s transfer (if applicable):
  ¡ Keep
  ¡ RejectThe Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 36
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Next, please indicate which player you decide to be the winner by 
underlining one of the options below:
  ¡ Player A
  ¡ Player B
After this, an experimenter will collect the decision forms and we will 
proceed to the payout part and the questionnaire.
Please remain seated and refrain from any kind of interaction with the other 
participants.
Questionnaire for players A and B:
Player ID:
Please write your player ID at the top of this page.
Questionnaire: 
1.  What is your gender?
    ¡ Male
    ¡ Female 
2.  What is your age?..............
3.  What are you 
studying?........................................................................................................
4.  What is your 
nationality?.....................................................................................................
5.  Please describe your strategy when choosing the amount you transferred to player 
C?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………The Journal of Philosophical Economics VII:1 (2013) 37
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Questionnaire for players C:
Player ID:
Please write your player ID at the top of this page.
Questionnaire: 
6.  What is your gender?
    ¡ Male
    ¡ Female 
7.  What is your age?..............
8.  What are you 
studying?.......................................................................................................
9.  What is your 
nationality?.....................................................................................................
10. Please describe your strategy when deciding the winning player between A 
and B?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………